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NOTES AND COMMENTS
COMMENT: MENTAL HEALTH LAW-Temporary
Detention of "Voluntary" Patients by Hospital
Authorities: Due Process Issues

I. INTRODUCTION

Compulsory hospitalization of the mentally ill has been justified for
decades on the basis of the sovereign's responsibility to care for the
disabled and power to protect the safety and welfare of the community.
In recent years, medical and legal authorities have questioned the efficacy
of compulsory hospitalization and have supported legislation which is
designed to increase voluntary admissions. In many states, however,
voluntary admission statutes allow hospital authorities to detain voluntary
patients after they have requested release. This Comment will discuss the
constitutionality as well as the wisdom of transforming voluntary patients
into involuntary detainees at the option of hospital authorities. It will also
consider the constitutional sufficiency of the process by which the decision
to detain a patient is made.
II. VOLUNTARY ADMISSION PROCEDURES GENERALLY

Legislative schemes generally divide institutional' treatment of the
mentally disabled into two categories: "voluntary" and "involuntary. '"2
Standards and procedures for admission, rights of the patient while hospitalized, and procedures for discharge, are closely regulated by statute
in all states, and will differ according to whether the patient is characterized as "voluntary" or "involuntary." 3 Typically, a voluntary admission requires an affirmative act or at least acquiescence 4 on the part of
the individual who recognizes his need for mental health treatment in a
residential facility.'
1. In this Comment, the term "institution" is used interchangeably with "hospital" and "residential
facility" to mean an in-patient facility for the treatment of persons with mental disorders.
2. Compare N.M. Stat. Ann. §§43-1-11, -12 (1978) (involuntary commitment) with §43-1-14
(1978).
3. American Bar Foundation, The Mentally Disabled and the Law 17 (S.Brakel & R. Rock eds.,
rev. ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as American Bar Foundation].
4. In most states a person may be "voluntarily" admitted by another person on his behalf. See,
Ann. Stat. ch. 9112, § 3-401 (Smith-Hurd 1979).
e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 88-503.1 (1978); I11.
5. There is evidence that a large percentage of patients admitted under voluntary procedures are
actually under coercion from family or police when they are presented for admission and agree to
hospitalization under threat of involuntary procedure. Gilboy & Schmidt, "Voluntary"Hospitalization
66 Nw. U.L. Rev. 429 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Gilboy & Schmidt]. Cateof the Mentally Ill,
gorization of these patients as "voluntary" is clearly inappropriate and may be no more than an
attempt to avoid the more complicated and demanding procedures for involuntary commitment. This
Comment assumes that there is a large number of persons for whom voluntary admission is appropriate
and possible. The interests of this latter group and the advantages of voluntary treatment warrant
legislative and public concern that truly voluntary hospitalization be made available.
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The availability of voluntary admission to mental health facilities is
important for both medical6 and societal7 reasons. A person presumably8
seeks hospitalization because he recognizes that he needs psychiatric
treatment. He is consequently more likely to participate actively in his
treatment and cooperate with his physician, elements which are extremely
important for effective treatment. 9 Additionally, the availability of voluntary hospitalization will increase the likelihood that an individual will
seek treatment at an early stage, when there is a greater likelihood of
recovery.'" The positive aspects of voluntary hospitalization promote societal interests as well. In the commentary to the 1952 Draft Act Governing
Hospitalization of the Mentally I11," the National Institute of Mental
Health emphasized the costs to the community resulting from an exclusively involuntary hospitalization system:
Making hospitalization ...

readily available to the mentally ill...

should reduce the financial and human cost of mental illness which
is greatest when the patient's condition has been aggravated by delay
in treatment or by the experience of forcible hospitalization, and
when, recovery2 having become impossible, life-long custody is the
only prospect.'

From the medical point of view, the recovery prospects are better and
the length of hospitalization is often shorter when the patient voluntarily
seeks early treatment. The expenditure of funds' 3 and manpower required
by extended hospitalization justify the attempts to construct a truly voluntary system of mental health care.
From the strictly medical point of view, there is little doubt as to the desirability of
voluntary admissions to a treatment program as opposed to involuntary commitment.
• . . Motivation to seek help is implicit in voluntary admission. The patient recognizes he has a problem. He wants to be treated. He is receptive to therapy.
Hearings before the Senate Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights, 91st Cong., Ist & 2nd Sess., 35
(1970) (Statement of Dr. John Donnely, Psychiatrist in Chief, Institute of Living, Hartford, Conn.)
[hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings]. The therapeutic advantages of voluntary submission to treatment
will only apply when the patient is truly a volunteer. See supra note 5.
7. See National Institute of Mental Health, Federal Security Agency, A Draft Act Governing
Hospitalization of the Mentally 11, Commentary at 19 (Public Health Service Pub. no. 51, 1952)
(Reprinted in The Mentally Disabled and The Law 454 (S. Brakel & R. Rock eds., rev. ed. 1971)),
[hereinafter cited as DraftAct].
8. See supra note 5.
9. See DraftAct, supra note 7, Commentary at 19.
10. See Draft Act, supra note 7, Commentary at 19.
11. See supra note 7.
12. Draft Act, supra note 7, Commentary at 19.
13. A 1974 study by The Joint Information Service of the American Psychiatric Association and
the National Association for Mental Health revealed that maintenance expenditures per patient-day
averaged $30.86 in the United States in that year and that expenditures of state and county mental
health hospitals totaled nearly $2.5 billion. These figures represented a 107 percent increase from
a previous study in 1970. 16 Indices 14-15 (Joint Information Service 1976 ed.).
6.
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The harmful effects of compulsory hospitalization make the need for
voluntary procedures for admission even more clear. Some authorities in
the mental health field insist that forced hospitalization makes effective
treatment impossible. 4 There is evidence that the trauma caused by forced
hospitalization actually can result in deterioration of the patient's physical
and psychological condition. 5 The advantages of voluntary treatment
compared to the harmful effects of compulsory hospitalization make readily available voluntary admission an important legislative goal. 16
Voluntary hospitalization in a mental health facility cannot always,
however, be considered entirely voluntary. Many mental health codes
give the institution the option of detaining a voluntary patient after he
has requested release.' 7 The period which may elapse before the hospital
must release a patient or institute involuntary proceedings is usually specified and ranges from twenty-four hours'" to thirty-five days. 9 Under most
statutes, hospital authorities may institute involuntary commitment proceedings during detention.2" The filing of a commitment petition may
result in further extended detention, pending civil commitment proceedings. 2
It is clear that, at the point the patient requests release, he is no longer
affirmatively seeking residential treatment or even acquiescing passively
in its provision. He can no longer be considered voluntary. Although he
may continue to be categorized as "voluntary," the denial of immediate
release necessarily changes the circumstances of hospitalization to that
of compulsion.
Statutory provisions which allow the hospital to detain a voluntary
patient after he has requested release may deter a mentally disabled individual who would otherwise become a voluntary patient from admitting
himself. One court pointed out that the advantages of voluntary admission
are less likely to be realized and persons who recognize their need
for hospitalization are less likely to seek it if, after . . . voluntary
14. Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1961) (Statement of the
American Psychiatric Association) [hereinafter cited as 1961 Hearings].
15. Prock, Effects of Institutionalization:A Comparison of Community, Waiting List, and InstitutionalizedAged Persons, 59 Am. J. Pub. Health 1837 (1969).
16. Mental Health Law Project, Legal Issues in State Mental Health Care:Proposalsfor Change,
2 Mental Disability L. Rep. 57, 94 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Mental Health Law Project]; American
Bar Foundation, supra note 3, at 18; DraftAct, supra note 7, Commentary at 19.
17. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. §47.30.050 (1979); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-519(C) (Supp. 1980);
Ga. Code Ann. § 88-503.2 (1978); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-14(C) (1978).
18. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §36-519(B) (Supp. 1980).
19. Alaska Stat. § 47.30.050 (1979) (request for release may not be made until patient has been
hospitalized thirty days; discharge may be postponed for an additional five days).
20. E.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-1-14(C) (1978).
21. E.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 91/2, § 3-403 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979) (five days initially, plus five
days pending proceedings).
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admission .. they then can be subjected to involuntary commitment
without a significant change in their condition, the 22perception of their
condition, or their willingness to be hospitalized.

Such a deterrent effect may undermine legislative efforts to encourage
voluntary submission to treatment.
The detrimental effects which necessarily accompany forced hospitalization are immediate. According to testimony presented to the Senate
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights:
[E]xperience has indicated that any kind of forceable detention of a
person in an alien environment may seriously affect him in the first
few days of detention, leading to all sorts of acute traumatic and
iatrogenic symptoms and troubles. By "iatrogenic" I mean things
that are caused by the very act of hospitalization which is supposed
to be therapeutic; in other words, the hospitalization process itself
causes the disturbance rather than the disturbance requiring hospitalization. 23
1II. COMPETING INTERESTS

The deterrent and detrimental effects of a hospital's option to detain a
previously voluntary patient may discourage voluntary admissions and4
will often negate the therapeutic advantages of voluntary admission.1
Such provisions will undermine legislative efforts to encourage voluntary
admission. The reason for this apparent inconsistency is that encouraging
voluntary admission over involuntary commitment is not the only purpose
underlying mental health legislation. Statutory regulation of mental health
facilities attempts to accommodate several different and often conflicting
interests and viewpoints. Analysis of a provision which allows a hospital
to detain a patient who has entered voluntarily requires consideration and
balancing of the interests of the individual patient, the treatment providers,
22. Appeal of Niccoli, 372 A.2d 749, 754 (Pa. Super. 1977):
at any time abrogate that voluntary agreement of
The hospital should not ....
the patient. It has two effects.
First of all, on the particular patient, and secondly, it has the effect that word of
this spreads to all other patients, and the fear instilled in them, both those in the
hospital and those who might come into the hospital, would lead to a great
diminution rather than an increase in voluntary admissions.
See, 1970 Hearings, supra note 6, at 39 (Statement of Dr. John Donnely).
23. 1970 Hearings, supra note 6, at 210 (Statement of Arthur Cohen, National Capitol Area Civil
Liberties Union).
24. Some patients who are detained temporarily after they have requested release may be persuaded
to accept treatment. It is difficult to determine, however, whether a patient has voluntarily and
understandingly accepted treatment or has relented under coercion from hospital staff and the environment of the hospital itself. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
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and the public. 2" This analysis reveals the dilemmas inherent in designing
a mental health system which will serve these interests effectively.
A. Private Interests: The Interests of the Mentally Disabled
The interests of the individual mental health patient may themselves
be conflicting. The legal advocate of the patient would protect the constitutional rights of the individual from unnecessary deprivation of his
liberty and intrusion into his privacy. From the viewpoint of the medical
profession, the interest of the patient in treatment and recovery is paramount. The personal interests of the patient who has requested release
potentially encompass elements of both sets of professional interests. The
voluntary patient's request for release reflects his desire to avoid the highly
restrictive and intrusive environment of the hospital. The request does
not, however, necessarily indicate the patient's failure to recognize his
need for continued treatment. Many patients may have a dual interest in
avoiding institutionalization and in seeking treatment in a less restrictive
environment.
1. Liberty Interest of the Patient
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that, to the individual,
institutionalization means a "massive curtailment of liberty" 2 6 and personal autonomy. The restraint on physical liberty in most residential
mental health facilities is no less than that imposed by penal incarceration.27 In many instances, mental health institutionalization will entail
even more restriction on liberty than the simple confinement typical of
penal incarceration. 28 In a residential facility, the mental patient's every
activity is regulated by hospital administrative and medical staff.29 Hospital conditions,3" staff efforts to make their jobs more manageable, and
medical therapeutic controls closely regulate the patient's every move.
25. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the United States Supreme Court outlined the
balancing test for measuring constitutional sufficiency of a statute under procedural due process
analysis. See infra notes 87-156 and accompanying text.
26. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
27. Mental Health Law Project, supra note 16, at 80 and 57.
28. Freedom of movement may be even more important to the mentally disabled individual than
to the mentally healthy criminal defendant. There is evidence that involuntary hospitalization will
exacerbate the symptoms of mental illness. 1970 Hearings, supra note 6, at 214-15, 319, 409.
29. Mental Health Law Project, supra note 16, at 8; 1970 Hearings, supra note 6, at 424.
30. State mental hospitals are often over-crowded and under-staffed. Although many mental health
codes now require that facilities maintain "a humane psychological and physical environment," e.g.,
N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-1-6(D) (1978), limited resources and administrative burdens often make
accomplishment of this goal impossible. In many institutions, the mental patient is subject to
overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, and often abusive, or at least intrusive, behavior of other
patients. See Mental Health Law Project, supra note 16, at 80. The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals,
studying conditions in Alabama institutions, found that:
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In the area of criminal procedure, the United States Supreme Court
has repeatedly recognized the high value placed on freedom of movement
by American society.3' The courts have distinguished the mental health
patient from the criminal defendant, stressing that detention of the mentally ill is not penal, but paternal in nature. 32 The courts have also recognized, however, the importance to the individual of not being restrained
in a mental health institution unnecessarily,33 no matter how good the
intentions of the custodian.34
There is an additional private liberty interest in avoiding the social
stigma35 of having been confined to a mental institution. The United States
Supreme Court characterized the damage to reputation which may result
from involuntary commitment as deprivation of "liberty," which is distinguished from physical restraint.3 6 Countervailing considerations make
There were severe health and safety problems: patients with open wounds and
inadequately treated skin diseases were in imminent danger of infection because
of the unsanitary conditions existing in the wards, such as permitting urine and
feces to remain on the floor; there was evidence of insect infestation in the kitchen
and dining areas. Malnutrition was a problem ...
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1310 (5th Cir. 1974). Professor Rosenhan found that, even where
conditions are adequate, even plush, institutionalization is dehumanizing. Rosenhan, On Being Sane
in Insane Places, 13 Santa Clara Lawyer 379 (1973).
31. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (heightened procedural safeguards
required where criminal defendant faces jail sentence).
32. Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265, 1269 (D. Conn. 1972), affd sub nom. Briggs v. Arafeh,
411 U.S. 911 (1973) (many due process safeguards guaranteed in criminal procedure do not attach
in the civil commitment process); but see Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1088-90 (E.D.
Wis. 1972), remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), remanded,
421 U.S. 957 (1975), on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976): "Even a brief examination of the
effects of civil commitment upon those adjudged mentally ill shows the importance of strict adherence
to stringent procedural requirements and the necessity for narrow, precise standards." Id. at 1088.
33. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979);
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Specht v.
Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1965).
34. Cf., In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967) (Constitution requires procedural protection of the
juvenile's liberty interest in delinquency proceedings). One court stated that, "[it is the likelihood
of involuntary incarceration-whether for punishment as an adult for a crime, rehabilitation as a
juvenile for delinquency, or treatment and training as a feeble-minded or mental incompetent-which
commands observance of the constitutional safeguards of due process." Heryford v. Parker, 396
F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968).
35. In addition to the social stigma which results from hospitalization in a mental institution,
Erving Goffman describes a self-stigmatization which "mirrors" the degrading hospital experience.
E. Goffman, Asylums 148-152 (1961).
In the mental hospital, the setting and the house rules press home to the patient
that he is, after all, a mental case who has suffered some kind of social collapse
on the outside, having failed in some over-all way, and that here he is of little
social weight, being hardly capable of acting like a full-fledged person at all.
Id. at 151-152.
36. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980): "The loss of liberty produced by an involuntary
commitment is more than a loss of freedom from confinement. It is indisputable that commitment
to a mental hospital 'can engender adverse social consequences to the individual' . . . Addington v.
Texas [441 U.S. 418 (1979)] at 425-26." Comparing the effects of the criminal sentence, one lower
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it difficult, however, to assess the weight of the voluntary patient's interest
in avoiding the stigma of institutionalization.
In two recent cases, considering the constitutionality of procedural
aspects of civil commitment, the United States Supreme Court expressed
the view that the stigma of institutionalization may be less than the stigma
of the "symptomatology of a mental or emotional illness" in the community.37 The Court assumed that the bizarre behavior of a severely
disabled person may cause more serious social, financial and legal difficulties than would hospitalization which may remit the symptoms of
the disorder. In both cases, the Court was reviewing procedures for initiation of hospitalization. The Court considered the stigmatization of
bizarre behavior in the community as an alternative to the stigma produced
by hospitalization. The voluntary patient, however, is already hospitalized. The decision to deny his request for release provides the additional
source of stigma resulting from involuntary hospitalization.
The voluntary patient may also be viewed as suffering only de minimus
additional stigma as a result of being detained beyond the time he has
been institutionalized voluntarily. Any stigma which attaches to the fact
of hospitalization has attached as a consequence of the patient's voluntary
act. It may be that the individual's interest in protecting his reputation
will be considered minimal by courts and legislatures, because he entered
the hospital voluntarily and because hospital authorities may only detain
him temporarily before establishing the need for continued hospitalization.
The decision to detain a patient is, however, stigmatizing in a way that
voluntary admission to the hospital is not. Involuntary institutionalization
has a detrimental effect on an individual's liberty interest which may be
particularly damaging to the mental health patient. The decision to deny
a voluntary patient's request for release reflects a determination that the
patient is incapable of making his own decisions about how he should
live and deal with his problems. The patient's awareness of this determination results in self-deprecation and loss of self-confidence. 38 Indeed,
the decision to detain a patient may eventually prove to be erroneous.
Further investigation by hospital authorities or civil commitment proceedings may result in release. The injury to the patient's liberty interest
in the form of loss of self-worth, however, may be substantial and irreparable.
federal court pointed out that the social stigma which attaches to imprisonment may be less than
that of the ex-mental patient. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1088-89 (E.D. Wis. 1972),
remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), remanded, 421 U.S. 957
(1975), on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976); See also, 1970 Hearings, supra note 6, at 284
(Testimony of Bruce J. Ennis, American Civil Liberties Union, New York City).
37. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 601 (1979); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).
38. Mental Health Law Project, supra note 16, at 81.
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Similarly, the disruption of family, social, and economic ties may be
attributed to the patient's own voluntary act of admission for treatment.
This "discounting" of the individual's interest in maintaining involvement
with the community ignores the important factor of the duration of institutionalization. One expert testified before the Senate Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights that the longer a person is hospitalized, the more
difficult it becomes for him to re-integrate into community life. 39 The
increasing difficulty is in part due to the dissolution of community ties
and the impossibility of carrying on normal social and economic activity
while the patient is hospitalized. The duration of institutionalization which
will irreparably damage community relationships and endeavors will vary
with the individual. The effect of the disruption on mental health is more
certain: "Through our accumulated research findings and clinical experience, we know that most mental illness can be treated more effectively
when detected and diagnosed early and properly, and when the positive
relationships between the individual and his family, his job, and his
community are not severed. "I Although the individual may have initially
cut himself off from the community voluntarily, he may request release
because he is aware of an increasing or unforeseen effect which segregation will have on his return to the community.
2. Privacy Interest of the Patient
In addition to the patient's liberty interest, detention in a mental institution threatens constitutionally protected privacy interests. Conditions
in a typical state mental institution often make individual privacy impossible. 4' State hospitals typically house large numbers of patients in
wards where there is insufficient space to provide any individual patient
with privacy.4" Also, in order to maintain control over the behavior of a
large number of patients, hospital staff keep "watch" on the wards twentyfour hours a day. 3 One commentator has likened mental hospital living
to a "goldfish-bowl existence."4
39. 1970 Hearings, supra note 6, at 409 (Statement of Dr. Sherman Kieffer, Director, National
Center for Mental Health Services, Training and Research, of St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington,

D.C.).

40. 1970 Hearings, supra note 6, at 319 (Statement of Dr. Sherman Kieffer).
41. See supra note 30. A federal court, reviewing conditions in Alabama hospitals found that
"[platients in the hospitals were afforded virtually no privacy: the wards were overcrowded; there
was no furniture where patients could keep clothing; there were no partitions between commodes
in the bathrooms." Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1310 (5th Cir. 1974).
42. 503 F.2d at 1310.
43. Several state legislatures have provided for some measure of privacy by requiring that the
patient be provided "reasonable storage space for his personal possessions" and that he "be afforded
reasonable privacy in his sleeping and personal hygiene practices." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-6(D)
(1978). As with most legislative attempts to improve hospital conditions, however, "reasonable"
privacy measures are limited by inadequate staffing and budgets.
44. Mental Health Law Project, supra note 16, at 81.
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The mental patient is deprived of an even more important privacy
interest when he loses the right of control over medical and psychological
treatments.45 Psychiatric examination, by its nature, is particularly intrusive in that it probes into the innermost thoughts and feelings of the
patient.4 6 Courts considering the mental patient's right to refuse treatment
have stated that the individual who voluntarily admits himelf to the hospital, in effect, consents to the treatment choices of the physician. 47 If

the voluntary patient has no right to select or refuse treatment modalities
chosen by the physician while hospitalized, his only means of control is
to seek release. As a practical matter, the hospital's denial of release is
a denial of the patient's only semblance of control over treatment decisions.
The individual privacy interest protected by the Constitution is not,
however, absolute. 48 It is necessarily limited by overriding public interests
and the interests of other individuals.49 It may not be feasible to administer
50
a mental hospital in such a way as to provide full privacy to patients.
The special difficulties of treating the mentally disabled may also justify
intrusive treatment absent the patient consent which is required in ordinary
medical treatment. 5' As a consequence, the patient's protected privacy
45. See Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144-45 (D.N.J. 1978) (privacy includes the right
to protect one's mental processes from interference); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 750 (Okla. 1980)
(when "forcibly medicated, a patient's emerging constitutional right of privacy may be violated.");
Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977)
(privacy "encompasses the right of a patient to preserve his or her right to privacy against unwanted
infringements of bodily integrity" where countervailing interests of the state do not outweigh the
individual interest); Cf., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) ("Among the historic
liberties [protected by the Due Process Clause] was the right to be free from. . . unjustified intrusions
on personal security."); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957) ("right of an individual
that his person be held inviolable").
46. Cf., Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 1976) (Hufstedler, Cir. J.,
concurring and dissenting), considering the confidential nature of psychiatrist-patient communications: "Psychotherapy probes the core of the patient's personality. The patient's most intimate thoughts
and emotions are exposed during the course of treatment."
47. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 661 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3788 (April
21, 1981), argued, sub nor. Mills v. Rogers, 50 U.S.L.W. 3569 (Jan. 13, 1982).
48. Roe v.Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973); Doe v.Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
49. See Superintendent of Belchertown v.Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977)
(protection of innocent third persons and prevention of suicide discussed as countervailing state
interests which can outweigh individual interest in being free from nonconsensual invasion of bodily
integrity). Cf., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973) (state's interest in protecting fetal life
overrides the mother's privacy interest at the point of viability).
50. See supra note 43.
51. The conflicting viewpoints concerning the voluntary patient's right to refuse treatment are
beyond the scope of this Comment. It should be noted, however, that the courts have recognized
that, in some circumstances, the interests of the state will justify treatment without the consent of
the patient. See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980) cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W.
3788 (April 21, 1981), argued, sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 50 U.S.L.W. 3569 (Jan. 13, 1982) (forced
medication permissible to prevent violence).
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interests are necessarily threatened whenever the hospital authorities have
the option of detaining him.
3. Another Viewpoint
Proponents of treatment in mental institutions point to positive aspects
of the effects on the individual of compulsory hospitalization. One legal
commentator, discussing policy considerations underlying civil commitment, summarized the arguments which could be made in support of
compulsory hospitalization:
Temporary regulation of daily routine and the provision of necessities
may free an individual to focus his attention and efforts upon his
mental and behavioral difficulties. Forced medicatio [sic] and other
forms of treatment may relieve symptoms that would otherwise prevent the individual from functioning effectively and may so demonstrate their value to him that he is soon willing to accept them
voluntarily.
[T]emporary removal from the community during a psychotic episode
may protect the individual from more serious personal problems than
result from commitment. 2
These potentially positive aspects of residential treatment may, in some
cases, outweigh the negative consequences to the individual of compulsory hospitalization. The only patients who will benefit from these positive
aspects, however, are the patients who indeed require compulsory hospitalization and for whom confinement can be justified. They cannot, in
any case, justify the deprivation suffered by the patient who is restrained
unnecessarily.
B. Interests of the Physician/Hospital3
Mental health clinicians and administrators protest that their interest
in detaining patients is not different from those of the patient and society.
From the medical viewpoint, the more important right and need of the
patient is that of effective treatment, though the patient's illness may
prevent him from recognizing his need for professional help. 4 Clinicians
52. Mental Health Law Project, supra note 16, at 81.
53. The interests of the physician and hospital and those of the state are theoretically the same.
The option of the hospital to detain a patient is a delegation of the state's power and is justified only
in that the action promotes state interests. See infra notes 68-81 and accompanying text. There are
interests of the physician/hospital, however, which are distinct from those of the state and will have
a special effect on the decision to deny a voluntary patient's request for release.
54. American Psychiatric Association, Comments on Civil Commitment, 2 Mental Disability L.
Rep. 519 (1978) [hereinafter cited as American Psychiatric Association].
By training and inclination, . . . [the physician would prefer] to treat people who
in their assessment need treatment even though their illness may lead some of
those people to make the choice of not being treated. The physician, in other
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and administrators point to the potential harm to effective mental health
care if they are cast as adversaries to the interests of the patient. 5 Inevitably, however, when the voluntary patient's desire to leave the hospital
is resisted by physicians or hospital personnel, physician and patient
become adversaries.
The conflict which arises between the physician and the patient will
not necessarily be between the desire to treat and the desire to avoid
treatment. The interest of the patient which is adverse to the interest of
the physician is that of protecting his liberty and privacy. A request for
release from the restrictive environment of the hospital does not always
indicate a denial of the need for treatment. In many cases, the patient
may only wish to seek less restrictive alternative modes of treatment. In
these cases, the physician/hospital's interest in providing treatment will
not necessarily conflict with that of the patient. The interest of the physician in ameliorating the symptoms of mental disorder is often better
served by treatment in a less restrictive environment than that of the
residential facility.56 Compulsory hospitalization may, in fact, only retard
the patient's progress and thus will fail to serve the interest of the clinician
in effective treatment. 7
It is more appropriate to focus on the physician/hospital's interests
underlying the desire to retain the authority to decide whether a voluntary
patient should be released . 5 8 Though related, these interests will be secondary to the principal function of the profession, that of providing necessary care. The medical profession has an interest in preserving the right
to make decisions as to appropriate treatment modalities, unencumbered
by legal limitations and procedures. 9 Any emphasis placed on the liberty
words, would prefer to err in the direction of giving treatment that may not be
necessary while the [lawyer] would err in the direction of not giving treatment
even though it may be desirable or necessary.
55. See, e.g., American Psychiatric Association, supra note 54, at 519; Ellis, Volunteering Children: ParentalCommitment of Minors to Mental Institutions, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 840, 843 (1974).
56. Some authorities suggest that the benefits of less restrictive treatment available through
community mental health centers mandate a preference for community treatment over in-patient care
in all cases. See Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: PracticalGuides
and ConstitutionalImperatives, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 1107 (1972).
57. See supra notes 12-13, 32 and accompanying text.
58. Not all mental health professionals want the responsibility of making that decision:
I would say that the vast majority of psychiatrists feel that if a patient admits
himself voluntarily to a hospital, then he should retain the right to leave the
hospital. If it is necessary that confinement be instituted, then there should be
some other procedure other than the hospital taking that step.
1970 Hearings, supra note 6, at 38 (Statement of Dr. John Donnely). The medical profession's
response to legislation which limits the physician's prerogatives, however, indicates that Dr. Donnely's "vast majority" is exaggerated. See, e.g., L. Kahle & B. Sales, "Due Process of Law and the
Attitudes of Professionals Toward Involuntary Civil Commitment," New Directions in Psychological
Research 265-292 (P. Lipsitt & B. Sales, eds., 1980); American Psychiatric Association, supra note
54.
59. American Psychiatric Association, supra note 48, at 520.
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and privacy interests of the individual necessarily results in limitation
and regulation of the physician's decision-making authority.
The mental health profession has defended the right to make treatment
decisions most vigorously. The individual patient's resistance to a form
of treatment is often viewed as a symptom of disorder. Some patients are
actually unable, by reason of their disorders, to make their own treatment
decisions.' Additionally, some mental health professionals insist that
psychiatric training is so specialized that laypersons are never qualified
to make treatment decisions.6 1
Another of the physician/hospital interests is similar to governmental
interests in confining the mentally ill: protecting the individual and third
62
persons from the dangerous acts of the prematurely released patient.
The sources of the physician/hospital's concern, however, may be different from those of the state.
The medical profession has a general ethical responsibility to preserve
life and relieve suffering.63 The general view is that, in order to fulfill
this responsibility, the psychiatric professional must be permitted to control behavior of patients who are potentially dangerous to themselves or
others.'
Furthermore, in some jurisdictions, the party responsible for negligently releasing a patient can be held liable for the eventual suicide of
the patient65 or harm caused' by the patient. Appropriate legislation would
prevent this concern. The physician or hospital cannot be held liable for
failure to act when they are forbidden by law to act. Legislation which
60. Critics of the mental health profession express doubt, however, as to whether the nature of
mental disorder justifies the power psychiatrists have traditionally held over their patients. See, e.g.,
J. Robitscher, The Powers of Psychiatry (1980); Drugs in Institutions: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, Cong., Sess. 13-17, 4 (1975)
(Statement of Janet Gotkin, ex-mental patient) [hereinafter referred to as 1975 Hearings]; B. Ennis,
Prisoners of Psychiatry (1972).
61. See American Psychiatric Association, supra note 54, at 520. For a discussion of the allocation
of decision-making authority between the medical expert and the layman which considers the opposite
viewpoint as well as that of the physician, see Gold, Wiser Than the Laws?: The LegalAccountabili,
of the Medical Profession, 7 Am. J. of L. and Med. 145 (1981). One noted commentator has
characterized the medical profession's effectiveness as illusory and trust in the special expertise of
physicians as the "new epidemic". I. Illich, Medical Nemesis (1976). Illich warns that "[a] crisis
of confidence in modem medicine is upon us." Id. at 4. He states that, "[a]s soon as medical
effectiveness is assessed in ordinary language, it immediately appears that the most effective diagnosis
and treatment do not go beyond the understanding that any layman can develop." Id. at 172.
62. See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
63. American Psychiatric Association, supra note 54, at 519.
64. Id. at 519-20.
65. Meier v. Ross Gen. Hosp., 69 Cal.2d 420, 445 P.2d 519, 71 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1968); Vistica
v. Presbyterian Hosp., 67 Cal. 2d 465, 432 P.2d 193, 62 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1967); see generally, W.
Prosser, Law of Torts 172, n. 39 (4th ed. 1971).
66. See generally, Annot., Liability of One Releasing Institutionalized Mental Patient for Harm
He Causes, 38 A.L.R.3d 699 (1971); Underwood v. United States, 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966).
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expressly denies the hospital's authority to detain a voluntary patient or
statutory exemption from liability for premature release, 67 should effectively end such concern.
C. State Interests
The state's power to detain any person deemed to be "mentally ill,"
is founded on two doctrinal bases: the "police power" of the state to
protect the community and the parental or parens patriae responsibility
to care for disabled members of the community. 68 Statutory authority in
the hospital to detain a voluntary patient after his request for release is
a delegation of the state's power. Thus, the hospital's authority can be
justified only on the basis of the state's police or parens patriaepower.
1. Police Power
Each state has the authority, derived from its police power, to protect
the members of the community from the anti-social acts of the mentally
disabled.69 This inherent power in the states provides the basis for involuntary commitment of individuals who present a threat of harm to the
person or property of others. 7" All states have statutes which permit
involuntary commitment to a mental hospital where there has been a
finding that, as a result of mental disorder, the person presents a threat
of serious harm to others. 7
67. Some states already provide similar exemption. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 88-502.23 (1978);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §71.05.120 (Supp. 1982). A recent survey of the tort case law on the
responsibility of mentally disabled persons indicates that "[t]he general rule is that mentally disabled
adults are to be held responsible for the torts they commit." Ellis, Tort Responsibility of Mentally
Disabled Persons, 1981 Am. B. Found. Research J. 1079, 1081 (citing McGuire v. Almy, 297 Mass.
323, 8 N.E.2d 760 (1937); Johnson v. Lambotte, 147 Colo. 203, 363 P.2d 165 (1961)). Professor
Ellis also observed, however, that "[m]entally disabled persons as a class tend to be judgment proof."
id. at 1080. The individual who has been institutionalized will often lack resources sufficient to
compensate a victim of his tortious conduct. The physician or hospital will frequently be a better
source of compensation. If the physician and hospital are not liable for premature release of the
patient, the victim may, in many cases, have no recourse. The victim of a tortfeasor who has been
released from a mental institution is in no different position, however, than is the victim of any
other "judgment-proof" tortfeasor.
68. Kittrie, Compulsory Mental Treatment and the Requirements of "Due Process," 21 Ohio St.
L. J. 28 (1960). Professor Kittrie includes in his discussion the authority of the state to care for the
"pauper" community. The state's interest in protecting the poor falls under the parens patriae power,
the general power of the state to protect the helpless.
69. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
70. Mental Health Law Project, supra note 16, at 83.
71. Id.; See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-1-10 (1978) (Emergency Detention), §43-1-11 (1978)
(Involuntary Commitment for a Thirty-Day Period).
Commitment under the criterion of dangerousness has been severely criticized in light of evidence
that psychiatric predictions of violence are extremely inaccurate. See, Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry
and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 693, 711716 (1974); Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosisand Treatment of Dangerousness. 18 Crime
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2. Parens Patriae
The states are also vested with the parens patriae power and moral
obligation to protect persons who, by reasons of disability, are unable to
act for themselves, including "infants, idiots, and lunatics." 7 2 Under this
power and obligation, the state may commit a mentally disabled person
to prevent suicide or self-inflicted bodily harm73 or physical harm resulting
from inability of the person to care for himself. 4
The state's power to detain a mentally disabled individual is traditionally recognized by the courts.75 On the other side, the individual's right
& Delinq. 371 (1972); Wenk, Robison & Smith, Can Violence be Predicted? 18 Crime & Delinq.
393 (1972); Hunt & Wiley, Operation Baxstrom After One Year, 124 Am. J. Psychiatry 974 (1968).
Despite the evidence, psychiatric indicators of potential dangerousness continue to be considered
constitutionally adequate to commit an individual involuntarily. Cf., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563 (1975); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) ("potential for doing harm, to
himself or to others, is great enough to justify such a massive curtailment of liberty.").
72. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972) (quoting 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *47).
73. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-1-13(E) (1978) (involuntary commitment of disabled adults
to residential care on finding that client's disability "creates .. .imminent likelihood of serious
harm to himself.").
As with the criterion of dangerousness, 'supra note 71, there is doubt as to whether psychiatrists
can predict suicide. Arthur Cohen of the American Civil Liberties Union has suggested that the
option to detain a voluntary patient is aimed at persons who, in the view of the hospital, are suicidal.
Mr. Cohen reports that the incidence of suicides among those persons is rare and concludes that
preventive detention of a voluntary patient is inappropriate to prevent suicide. 1970 Hearings, supra
note 16, at 212-228. See also Greenberg, Involuntary Psychiatric Commitments to Prevent Suicide,
49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 227 (1974).
74. "Harm to self" may include harm which falls short of suicide or self-inflicted bodily harm.
While recognizing the state's power to confine a person whose way of life may harm him, the United
States Supreme Court appears to limit the state's power when there is no showing of potential harm:
May the State confine the mentally ill merely to ensure them a living standard
superior to that they enjoy in the private community? That the State has a proper
interest in providing care and assistance to the unfortunate goes without saying.
But the mere presence of mental illness does not disqualify a person from preferring his home to the comforts of an institution. Moreover, while the State may
arguably confine a person to save him from harm, incarceration is rarely if ever
a necessary condition for raising the living standards of those capable of surviving
safely in freedom ....
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
A third criterion for commitment under the State's parens patriae power is the mental or emotional
deterioration of the individual who may be benefitted by hospitalization and treatment. Several courts
have held, however, that need for treatment is insufficient as a sole justification for compulsory
hospitalization. Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 514 (D. Neb. 1975) ("In the mental health
field, where diagnosis and treatment are uncertain, a need for treatment . ..is not a compelling
justification."); Kendall v. True, 391 F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Ky. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp.
378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974);
Cf., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975): "Assuming that [the term mental illness] can
be given a reasonably precise content and that the 'mentally ill' can be identified with reasonable
accuracy, there is still no constitutional basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they are
dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom." Id. at 575.
75. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (discussion of sources of state's power to confine); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
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to liberty is expressly protected by the fourteenth amendment. 6 The Court
has recognized the individual's right to privacy as "fundamental." 77 Both
interests are protected against unnecessary deprivation by state action.
There is "no constitutional basis for confining . . . persons involuntarily
if they are dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom." 78
When the state authorizes hospital authorities to detain an individual,
the constitutional limitations on the state's power must also limit the
power of the hospital. In order to justify detaining a voluntary patient
for any amount of time after his request for release, the decision-maker
must be held to constitutionally permissible criteria. The voluntary patient
whose detention would not serve the state's permissible interests cannot
be detained. Statutes which allow a physician or hospital administrator
to detain, for any amount of time, patients who are neither dangerous to
themselves nor to others, are constitutionally invalid.
When the voluntary patient is denied release, the deprivation of his
private interests is no different than that under involuntary commitment.79
Under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the state
cannot deprive voluntary patients of liberty and privacy under standards
more lax than those applied to persons who are involuntarily hospitalized
in commitment proceedings.8' The United States Supreme Court has held
that a person may be involuntarily committed only upon "clear and
convincing" proof that the patient meets the criteria for commitment. 8
This standard would appear to be constitutionally required in the decision
to detain a voluntary patient who has requested release.82
The voluntary patient who does meet constitutionally permissible criteria for involuntary hospitalization presents an entirely different question
than the patient who does not. The latter cannot be deprived of his liberty
for any amount of time because his confinement would serve no overriding
state interest. The judicially recognized interests of the state in confining
and treating the individual who presents a danger to himself or others,
however, is sufficient to justify depriving the former individual of his
liberty and privacy. This individual's interests are not lessened by the
fact that he may be dangerous. Nor is the state's interest in encouraging
76. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of... liberty ... without due process of law .
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
77. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing to cases in which the constitutional notions
of a guarantee of privacy have developed).
78. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
79. See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
80. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
81. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
82. The United States Supreme Court has not considered what standard should be applied in
determining whether a voluntary patient can be detained after he has requested release. It follows,
however, from the Court's decisions in Jackson and Addington that the determination must be made
under the same standard as that applied in other procedures to involuntary commit.
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voluntary treatment assured by procedures which allow unnecessary involuntary hospitalization. In order to protect the interests of the individual
and the state, the legislature should provide procedures which assure that
voluntary patients are not detained unnecessarily.
IV. PROCEDURE FOR DECISION TO DETAIN A
VOLUNTARY PATIENT: MATHEWS v. ELDRIDGE

None of the statutes studied provides an interim procedure for deciding
whether a voluntary patient should be allowed to leave the hospital at his
request prior to civil commitment proceedings. Most statutes specify only
the decision-maker, usually the hospital superintendent, 83 and the criteria
for detention. 84 Few statutes prescribe any standard for decision-making,
although Connecticut does give the patient the right to a probable cause
hearing. 85 In most hospitals, there appears to be no formal procedure for
deciding whether to detain a patient.86
The test applied to non-judicial decision-making in Mathews v. Eldridge7
serves as the framework for analyzing the constitutional sufficiency of
procedures required before an individual may be deprived of liberty or
property. Eldridge's social security disability benefits were terminated88
after an administrative determination that he was no longer disabled.
He challenged the constitutional validity of the administative procedures
provided. 89 Eldridge relied on the Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly90
and subsequent cases9' which established a right to a hearing prior to
83. See, e.g., N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.13(b) (McKinney 1978). The Washington statute provides that "the professional staff of any public or private agency or hospital" may detain a patient.
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 71,05.050 (Supp. 1982).
84. Alaska Stat. § 47.30.050(a)(3) (1979) (discharge "would be unsafe to the patient or others");
Ga. Code Ann. §88-503.2 (1979) (same); N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-1-14(C) (1978) (client requires
continued confinement and meets the criteria for involuntary residential treatment). The Idaho Code
allows detention when the patient is dangerous to the property of others. Idaho Code § 66-319 (Supp.
1979).
85. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-187(d) (West Supp. 1981).
86. R. Rock, M. Jacobson & J. Janopaul, Hospitalization and Discharge of the Mentally I1123032 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Hospitalization and Discharge]. This author could locate no more
recent studies which would indicate that hospitals provide more formal procedure for determining
whether a voluntary patient's request for release should be denied. Although legislatures have recently
focused on the rights of voluntary patients, see, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 47.30.050 (1979); Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §36-519 (Supp. 1981), there has been virtually no change in legislatively prescribed
procedures for the interim determinations. This Comment considers the constitutional sufficiency of
the procedure for the hospital's decision to detain a patient pending commitment proceedings, when,
in fact, the method for decision-making is often hardly recognizable as "procedure" at all.
87. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
88. Id. at 324.
89. Id. at 325.
90. 397 U.S. 254 (1970): "[W]hen welfare is discontinued, only a pre-termination evidentiary
hearing provides the recipient with procedural due process." Id. at 264.
91. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (interest in real property); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535 (1971) (revocation of driver's license).
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termination of property interests.9 2 The Eldridge Court distinguished
Goldberg, based on the differences between the claimants and the nature
of the inquiries relevant to the challenged procedures. 93 The Eldridge
Court analyzed Goldberg and other prior decisions and found that:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interests that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interests through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interests, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, [397 U.S.] at 263-271 . . .94
The Court also considered under what circumstances a claimant would
be entitled to a hearing before he was deprived of an important interest.
Eldridge challenged a procedure which deprived him of a property
interest. The Court expressly held, however, that the test should be applied
to governmental decision which deprives an individual of "liberty" as
well.95 Subsequently, courts have applied the Eldridge test to involuntary
commitment decision-making.9 6 The hospital decision to detain a voluntary patient who has requested release is a deprivation of constitutional
rights which warrants scrutiny under the Eldridge factors for analysis.
A. Pre-DeprivationHearing
The first issue addressed by the Eldridge Court was whether an individual threatened with governmental action is entitled to a predeprivation
hearing. 97 The Court stated that "[a] claim to a predeprivation hearing
as a matter of constitutional right rests on the proposition that full relief
cannot be obtained at a postdeprivation hearing. "98 The reason the courts
have provided heightened procedural safeguards when governmental ac92. 424 U.S. at 325-6.
93. 424 U.S. at 340-46. The Court pointed out that "the disabled worker's need is likely to be
less than that of the welfare recipient," 424 U.S. at 342. The Court characterized welfare recipients
as "persons on the very margin of subsistence .... " 424 U.S. at 340. In the case of the disabled
worker, "a medical assessment of the worker's physical or mental condition is required. This is a
more sharply focused and easily documented decision than the typical determination of welfare
entitlement." 424 U.S. at 343. For a thorough discussion of Eldridge, see Mashaw, The Supreme
Court's Due Process Calculusfor Administrative Adjudication In Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors

in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 28 (1976).
94. 424 U.S. at 335.
95. 424 U.S. at 332.
96. See, Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599-600 (1979).
97. 424 U.S. at 331.
98. Id.
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tion threatens to deprive an individual of liberty99 is that the harm caused
by restraint is irreparable.
Fundamentally, the guarantee of due process protection is a guarantee
of the right to be heard at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner. oo
Unnecessary denial of liberty for any amount of time cannot be compensated. "' Consequently, it appears at first glance that the patient's right
to liberty can be adequately protected only if he is given an opportunity
to be heard before the hospital authorities may detain him, even temporarily, pending the decision on whether to institute civil commitment
proceedings. This may be accomplished by a probable cause hearing soon
after the patient's request for release. 102
A preliminary hearing held soon after a request for release may, however, deny the patient the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner.
The Eldridge Court placed emphasis on the opportunity for effective
communication provided the recipient of social security benefits prior to
' The opportunity to communicate with the
the termination of benefits. 03
decision-maker must include a meaningful opportunity to present arguments and evidence and access to the evidence supporting the decision."
The patient who is denied immediate release should be afforded legal
counsel to assist him in gathering evidence and to present his arguments
at the hearing. The patient should also have access to examination and
advice from a medical expert who is independent from the hospital staff.
The opportunity to communicate effectively with the decision-maker should
also include access to the evidence which will be used to support a decision
to detain him.' 05 If a hearing to determine whether there is probable cause
99. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
100. Armstrong v.Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
101. Kenneth Donaldson claimed and was awarded damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against
for 15 years. O'Connor
of a hospital inwhich he was confined against hiswill
members of the staff
however, the harm caused
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Unlike harm to economic interests,
by deprivation of an individual's liberty and privacy interests cannot be truly compensated. The
claimant cannot be "made whole" and damages serve only as a substitute for his loss.
102. A federal court, considering emergency commitment of mentally ill persons, held that "the
maximum period which a person may be detained without apreliminary hearing is48 hours." Lessard
v.Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand,
379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976).
a patient involuntarily
responded tothe Lessard decision by requiring that
The Wisconsin legislature
arrival
atthe
confined be given a probable cause hearing within 72 hours of the emergency patient's
facility.
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 51.20(7) (West Supp. 1981).
The Connecticut statute
which authorizes the hospital todetain a voluntary patient provides for
a probable cause hearing on request within 72 hours of the request for release. Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 17-187(d) (West Supp. 1981).
103. 424 U.S. at337-39, 345-46.
104. Id. at345-46.
inobtaining their
own records. See Gotkin v.Miller,
105. Patients often encounter difficulties
514 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1975). Testifying before a United States Senate Subcommittee, investigating
a mental patient encounters when he
drugs ininstitutions,
Mrs. Gotkin described the difficulties
attempts toobtain his hospital records:
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to detain a patient is held too soon after his request for release, the patient
may not have time to prepare an adequate defense.
The patient's opportunity to defend at a preliminary hearing is especially important in light of the effect an adverse finding may have on
subsequent commitment proceedings. A finding of probable cause to believe that the patient meets the criteria for civil commitment would serve
its purpose only if based upon thorough examination of the evidence.
Such a finding may prejudice the patient in a later commitment proceeding.
It may better serve the patient's interests to dispense with the notion
of a preliminary hearing and provide for civil commitment proceedings
without delay. In such a case, hospital authorities should be authorized
to detain only patients against whom they intend to petition for commitment. °" This requirement will help to assure that hospital authorities
detain only patients they are reasonably certain meet the criteria for
commitment. Also, by means of the petition for commitment, the patient
will be notified of the bases of the hospital's tentative decision."'o Where
commitment proceedings will be the first opportunity the patient will have
to be heard, they should be delayed no longer than is necessary to prepare
evidence, to enable the patient to consult with an attorney and with an
independent medical expert, and to allow the patient to review the evidence against him.'
At a civil commitment proceeding, the patient will be afforded the
same procedural protections provided all persons facing involuntary confinement. " Pending commitment proceedings, however, the patient who
[I]n practice, an ex-mental patient cannot have access to their records, unless
they go through the procedure of requesting a doctor, and the doctor is supposed
to screen out what would be harmful, because the assumption behind it, whether
it is real or pretended is that we have been mentally ill, or we will be mentally
ill, and therefore, are not stable enough to see what has been written about us.
My own interpretation is a much more political one . . .I think the hospitals
are very intent and very serious upon maintaining a certain power, a certain
secrecy, and that they are able to function the way they have functioned, ...
because the institutions are closed and they are. not open to scrutiny.
1975 Hearings, supra note 60, at 7. The Connecticut statute provides for full access to records.
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-178 (West Supp. 1981). This provision is, however, unusual. Most
statutes include a provision for keeping a patient from reviewing those portions of his records which,
inthe discretion of the physician, would be harmful to the patient. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 431-19(D) (1978).
106. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-1-19(D) (1978).
107. The New Mexico statute governing involuntary commitment specifies that the petition "include a description of the specific behaviors or symptoms of the client which evidence a likelihood
of serious harm to the client or others" and "shall also list the prospective witnesses for commitment
and a summary to the matters to which they will testify." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-11(A) (1978).
108. Preparation for a commitment hearing should take no more than 5 days, as provided in
N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-1-14(C) (1978).
109. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-178 (West Supp. 1981); N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-111 (B) (1978).
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continues to be confined may require special protection because of disadvantages peculiar to hospitalization. Confinement may limit the patient's ability to communicate with counsel or prepare evidence in his
defense. The patient under medication may be unable to present organized
and coherent evidence in his defense. While detained, the patient is subject
to the coercive atmosphere of the institution, without any of the protections afforded criminal arrestees in the similarly coercive atmosphere of
the police station. "0 He may be interrogated during this time by the very
persons who will testify to his need for continued hospitalization. I" Temporary detention pending commitment proceedings may thus hamper the
patient's ability to protect himself against more extended loss of liberty
resulting from commitment proceedings. Special protections may be required to avoid disadvantage to the hospitalized patient facing civil commitment.
1. Private Interests
The first factor for consideration under the Eldridge test is the private
interest threatened by governmental action. The degree of threatened
deprivation is a factor in the analysis." 2 The deprivation which results
of a voluntary patient is sufficient to require special safefrom detention
3
guards. "1
110. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
111. This communication may be inadmissible as evidence under law which provides a patientpsychiatrist confidentiality privilege, absent a waiver or disclosure that the information will not be
privileged. See C.V. v. Texas, 616 SW.2d 441 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
art. 5561(h) (Vernon Supp. 1981). In jurisdictions which provide such protection, the patient must
at least be warned that his statements will be used against him.
In.New Mexico, there is a general rule that "[a] patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and
to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications, made for the purposes of
N.M. R. Evid. 504(b). The statute
diagnosis or treatment of his mental or emotional condition ....
makes a specific exception to the rule in proceedings for hospitalization: "There is no privilege
under this rule for communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for
mental illness, if the psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has determined that the
patient is in need of hospitalization." N.M. R. Evid. 504(d)(1).
112. 424 U.S. at 342.
113. See discussion accompanying notes 26-50, supra. The state's authority to detain a patient
may be considered by some to be contractual. The voluntary submission to institutionalization may
be considered a voluntary diminution of the patient's interests. Justice Stewart, in his concurring
opinion in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), distinguished the circumstance of voluntary patients:
"Clearly, if the appellees in this case were adults who had voluntarily chosen to commit themselves
to a state mental hospital, they could not claim that the State had thereby deprived them of liberty
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 622 (Stewart, J., concurring opinion). In Parham,
the Court considered whether the state should be required to have an adjudicative or adversarial
hearing for juveniles prior to "voluntary" commitment by their parents. The Court's decision that
such hearings were not required was based, in large part, on the duty and authority of parents to
care for the needs of their children. Id. at 602. The children had been committed "voluntarily" by
their parents and continued to be hospitalized at the will of their parents. Id. The Court had no
opportunity in that case to consider the loss of liberty of the adult patient. whose true status had
changed from voluntary to involuntary.
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The voluntary patient conceivably will be deemed to have waived his
interests when he subjected himself to treatment. The United States Supreme Court has accepted an individual's waiver of constitutional rights,
however, only where certain requirements are met. In order to be sufficient, waiver of constitutional rights must be both "intelligently and
understandingly" made" 4 and waiver must be "voluntary and uncoerced." ",5
Waiver must be "intelligently and understandingly" made." 6 Voluntary
admission statutes sometimes specifically provide that a patient be advised
of the hospital's option to detain him should he request release. "7 Some
statutes require that the terms of the patient's agreement appear in the
admission consent form and that they be posted in the hospital wards." 8
Several lower courts have held void any agreement to waive the right to liberty. In Ex parte
Romero, 51 N.M. 201, 181 P.2d 811 (1947), a New Mexico court rejected the argument that a
voluntary patient had, in effect, contracted to remain in a mental institution for the statutory period.
The court based its findings that the "agreement" was invalid on an assumption that any patient
who needs treatment is per se incompetent. The court noted: "Obviously, it does not require citation
of authority that one may not enforce such a contract made with a person he knows to be so disordered
in mind as to require treatment in an institution for the treatment of mental diseases." Id. at 203,
181 P.2d at 813. More recently, a New York court invalidated a voluntary patient's agreement to
deprive himself of rights accorded to "involuntary" patients based on similar rationale. People ex
rel. Kaminstein v. Brooklyn State Hosp., 49 Misc. 2d 57, 266 N.Y.S. 2d 916, 922-23 (Sup. Ct.
1966).
The conclusion in Romero that detaining a voluntary patient after request for release is a violation
of due process is appropriate. The rationale of the case is, however, dangerous. The decision reflects
the old rule that "mental patient status per se establishes legal incompetence-a rule which the law
has been dismantling rather successfully for some time." Wexler, Mental Health Law and the
Movement Toward Voluntary Treatment, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 671, 678 (1974). Commentators, writing
for the American Bar Foundation, point out that such a rule of law would be inappropriate to present
concepts of mental health treatment. "[Tihe contention that any patient who needs treatment is per
se incompetent to consent to admission unquestionably runs counter not only to the policy underlying
voluntary admission statutes of forty-nine states but to the weight of contemporary medical and legal
opinion." American Bar Foundation, supra note 3, at 22; see also Buttonow v. O'Neill, 23 N.Y.2d
385, __, 244 N.E.2d 677, 682 (1968).
A better argument is that no person may contract away his liberty and that it would be unconstitutional to enforce such an agreement. In Ex parte Lloyd, 13 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D. Ky. 1936), the
court considered the contract of a drug addict to submit to confinement until such time as he ceased
to be an addict under a federal statute. The court stated that to enforce the terms and conditions of
such a contract would be in violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment and the
thirteenth amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude. Id. at 1007, quoting Exparte McClusky,
40 F. 71 (D. Ark. 1889):
No man or no power has the right to take away another's liberty, even though
with consent, except by due process of law. . . . Liberty . . . is an inalienable
prerogative, of which no man by mere agreement can divest himself. Any
divestiture not occurring by due process of law is null.
Id. at 74.
114. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
115. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
116. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1937).
117. See, e.g., N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.07 (McKinney 1978).
118. See, e.g., N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.07(b) (McKinney 1978).
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Even where an attempt is made to comply with these provisions, 9 however, there is currently no procedural method for testing whether the
patient knew in fact that his agreement to be admitted was contingent on
waiver of his liberty interest. Even in the case of the truly voluntary
patient, there is a question as to whether the patient who suffers from the
stress of mental disorder and seeks the drastic measure of institutionalized
"understandingly" to relinquish his liberty sometime
treatment has agreed
20
1
future.
the
in
Waiver of a constitutional right must also be "voluntary and uncoerced."' 2 ' The atmosphere of a mental institution may be as coercive
as that of a police station. The Court has recognized the possible effect
of the jail environment on voluntary waiver of the right to remain silent,
and has placed protective restrictions on police interrogation of a criminal
patient
arrestee.' 2 2 No such protection has been afforded the voluntary
23
who may be coerced into agreeing to the terms of admission. 1
The circumstances of voluntary admission to a mental hospital and the
nature of residential mental health care certainly make any claim of waiver
of the patient's constitutional right to liberty questionable. However, it
is difficult to conceive of a statutory scheme which would absolutely
assure that every mental patient understands his rights and is free from
coercion. There should be a specific statutory requirement that the patient
be kept informed of his rights with regard to release and a prohibition
against using any form of coercion to persuade the patient to stay in the
hospital. The patient will be more able to make informed decisions if he
is allowed to seek independent medical advice. He will be better equipped
to resist coercion with the assistance of legal counsel. Such provisions
should not, however, be considered sufficient as bases for waiver of the
patient's constitutional rights.
The voluntary patient's interest in preserving his liberty and privacy
cannot be presumed to be different from that of any other individual. One
federal court, while providing for extensive procedural protection to an
119. One study indicated that the conditions of voluntary admission are sometimes presented to
the patient only cursorily for a variety of administrative reasons. Gilboy & Schmidt, supra note 5,
at 442-43. See also Owens, When is a Voluntary Commitment Really Voluntary? 47 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 104 (1977); Beis, Civil Commitment: Rights of the Mentally Disabled, Recent Developments and Trends, 23 De Paul L. Rev. 42, 52-53 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Beis].
120. To stay that the stressful conditions of admission to a mental hospital make the "understanding" waiver of a constitutional right questionable is not to say that a patient of a mental hospital
is per se incompetent as a matter of law. See discussion at note 113, supra.
121. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
122. Id. A Michigan court determined that legally adequate consent to experimental psychosurgery
could not be given by adults involuntarily confined in a mental institution. Kaimowitz v. Dep't. of
Mental Health, 2 Prison L. Rep. 433 (Cir. Ct. Mich. 1973).
123. See supra note 5.
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emergency patient, recognized that "the state may sometimes have a
compelling interest in emergency detention of persons who threaten violence to themselves or others for the purpose of protecting society and
the individual." 1 24 In such emergency situations, the state has the power
to authorize hospital authorities to detain a voluntary patient after he has
requested release, based upon a reasonable determination that the patient
is dangerous. Under such circumstances, the patient should be afforded
a proceeding in which such determination will be fairly tested as soon
as possible after his request for release has been denied.
2. Risk of Error/Fairnessof the Proceeding
The second consideration under the Eldridge test is the risk that the
procedure available will result in error. The Eldridge Court analyzed the
risk of error in the procedure by considering the nature of the relevant
inquiry. 125 In Eldridge, the relevant inquiry was whether the recipient of
Social Security disability benefits continued to be disabled. In the case
of a patient of a mental hospital, the inquiry will be whether the patient's
mental state is such that the state may deprive him of his liberty and
privacy. In jurisdictions where there are no specified criteria for the
decision to detain a voluntary patient 26 the "relevant inquiry" will not
be clear. The omission of specified criteria in a statute would appear to
authorize hospital authorities to detain a patient based on an individual
physician's opinion of the need for continued hospitalization, and would
certainly result in arbitrariness. The findings required in order to civilly
commit an individual' 27 would be more appropriate to a decision which
effectively results in an involuntary commitment. Where the hospital is
authorized to detain only patients against whom a petition for commitment
will be filed, there would be greater assurance that the detained patient
in fact meets the criteria for commitment.
No matter what criteria the decision-maker is required to meet, the
evidence on which the decision is based should be a valid assessment of
the individual patient's mental condition. This assessment may not be as
124. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (E.D. Wis. 1972), remanded, 414 U.S. 473
(1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), on remand, 413
F.Supp. 1318 (1976).
125. 424 U.S. at 343.
126. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
127. N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-1-1 I(C) (1978) provides for a thirty-day commitment:
[1If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that: (I) as a result of a
mental disorder, the client presents a likelihood of serious harm to himself or
others; (2) the client needs and is likely to benefit from the proposed treatment;
and (3) the proposed commitment is consistent with the treatment needs of the
client and with the least drastic means principle.
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"sharply focused"' or as credible as the assessment of physical condition
approved in Eldridge.129 In many state mental hospitals the psychiatristpatient ratio is so inadequate as to limit severely the frequency and duration of examinations.' 30 The authority making the decision whether to
detain a patient will often depend primarily on notes made in the patient's
record by non-medical staff."'3 A decision based on examination while a
patient is hospitalized may also be influenced by the institutional environment. Otherwise normal behavior is often diagnosed as abnormal,
simply because it occurred within the confines of a mental institution.' 32
The decision to detain or release a patient may also be based upon, or
at least affected by, non-medical factors which bear no relation to the
patient as an individual. "' The patient may effectively be denied immediate release by failure to respond to the request or by attempts to
dissuade the patient on the part of hospital staff.' This staff response
may result from such non-medical factors as the administrative difficulty
in processing the request,' 33 or even out of simple annoyance.136
Where the criterion for detention is dangerousness,' 3 7 institution au128. The Eldridge Court found submission of written medical reports sufficient to guarantee the
fairness and reliability of the Social Security Disability termination decision: "[T]he decision whether
to discontinue disability benefits will turn, in most cases, upon 'routine, standard, and unbiased
medical reports by physician specialists,' Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. [389], 404 [(1971)],
concerning a subject whom they have personally examined. [Footnote omitted]" 424 U.S. at 344
(emphasis added). In the mental health context, the hospital's decision to detain a voluntary patient
after he has requested release may not be so "sharply focused" as in the case of a medical determination of physical disability. See infra notes 129-140 and accompanying text.
129. 424 U.S. at 344 (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 404 (1971)).
130. See Mental Health Law Project, supra note 16, at 92.
131. See Hospitalizationand Discharge,supra note 86, at 230-32. Non-medical staff notes may
often provide descriptions of behavior which will indicate dangerous tendencies. Such descriptions
will often be helpful in determining whether a patient must be detained, especially where the hospital's
medical staff is inadequate to provide thorough examination. Non-medical staff notations should,
however, be given appropriate weight in the decision-making process and should not substitute for
medical assessment.
132. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 13 Santa Clara Lawyer 379 (1973). Professor
Rosenhan's interesting study revealed that a patient's admission diagnosis "profoundly colors others'
perceptions of him and his behavior." Id. at 386-388. Both normal and aberrent behavior was
perceived as symptomatic. In the study, pseudopatients were placed in separate mental hospitals.
Nurses observed the pseudopatients making notes of their observations. The staff records indicated
that the writing was perceived as pathological behavior. Id. at 388. See also S. Sarenson, The Clinical
Interaction (1954).
133. See Hospitalizationand Discharge, supra note 86, at 215-18. Rock's study, which covers
voluntary and involuntary patients, indicates that "[t]he decision to discharge a patient depends on
a variety of factors both medical and non-medical." Id. at 215.
134. See Beis, supra note 119, at 52-53.
135. Id.
136. The Goldberg Court, agreeing with the conclusions of the lower court, held that a pretermination evidentiary hearing was required before terminating welfare benefits. The decision was
in part due to "the possibility for honest error or irritablemisjudgment." 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970)
(quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 904-905 (1968)) (Emphasis added).
137. See supra note 84.
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thorities may have a tendency to overpredict dangerousness if they will
face liability for the acts of a prematurely released patient.' 38 A patient
who has recovered to the extent that he no longer requires hospitalization
may be detained because he has no family or home to return to in the
community.' 39 Hospital authorities may be especially reluctant to release
a patient who has been institutionalized for an extended period of 4time
0
and may be considered no longer able to adapt to community life.
The risk of a decision based on non-medical factors suggests that the
decision to detain a patient may not be based upon a "sharply focused"
and entirely credible medical assessment. The weight given to such nonmedical factors will increase the risk of error in the decision-making
process, especially where there are no specific criteria or standards of
proof to which the decision-maker can be held.
The Court has not defined the "error" against which the procedure for
deciding whether an individual should be involuntarily committed must
be measured. The most obvious error would be to detain a mentally
healthy individual who does not require hospitalization or treatment at
all. In light of the harm which would be caused by unnecessary deprivation
of liberty, detaining any individual who is mentally ill but who does not
meet the minimum criteria for involuntary commitment should also be
considered error.
The Court has also failed to make clear how it will measure error
resulting from an existing procedure and what percentage of erroneous
deprivation will be tolerated under constitutional analysis. The Eldridge
Court stated vaguely that the risk of error will be measured with regard
to the results of the procedure "as applied to the generality of cases, not
the rare exceptions."' 4
Where the criteria for detention are clear, error may be measured by
the number of patients who are detained but do not in fact meet the
specified criteria. If the criteria for detention are the same as those required
138. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
139.
[I]n application the common discharge standard depends on specific social
circumstances over which the patient has little control. The same circumstances
can influence his treatment program. The patient with strong social supports
attracts treatment and early release, whereas the patient lacking these supports
receives less treatment and his release is often delayed, or even withheld.
Hospitalization and Discharge, supra note 86, at 218.
140.
With the passing of each year discharge becomes a more remote possibility for
long-term patients. They become totally dependent on institutional care. Their
ties with the community gradually dissolve until they have no desire to be
released. Their families tend to drift away, their employable skills, if ever there
were any, tarnish and become obsolete, and they come to require the supervised
life in order to live at all.
Hospitalization and Discharge, supra note 86, at 228.
141. 424 U.S. at 344.
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for involuntary commitment, 1 2 the percentage of patients who are committed after a civil proceeding may indicate the percentage of error in
the initial decision to detain with regard to those individuals. The findings
of the civil commitment court will either confirm or reverse the hospital's
finding that the patient was an appropriate candidate for involuntary hospitalization. It is not clear, however, that the Court would use this percentage as a measure of the risk of error in procedures under which
hospital authorities decide to detain a patient who has voluntarily admitted
himself.
The Eldridge Court expressly rejected use of appealed reversals as the
sole measure of error in the social security termination procedure, and
stated that, "in order fully to assess the reliability and fairness of the
system of procedure, one must . . . consider the overall rate of error for
all denials. . . . ""' In the case of social security benefit termination, the
percentage of all decisions to terminate which were eventually reversed,
at various levels of review, was substantially lower than the percentage
of terminations which were appealed and ultimately reversed. Consequently, the percentage of erroneous initial determinations 44appeared much
lower when the overall rate of reversal was considered.
Consideration of the number of patients who were denied immediate
release, whether or not involuntary commitment proceedings are later
instituted against them, would probably lead to an opposite result. The
decision on the part of hospital authorities to forego civil commitment
proceedings against a patient who has been detained for that purpose
would indicate a decision that the initial assessment of the need for
continued hospitalization was erroneous. Consequently, factoring in the
overall number of patients who are detained but are never involuntarily
committed by a court would indicate a higher percentage of error than
would consideration of only commitment petitions which result in involuntary commitment.
There is another group of voluntary patients who are denied release
upon request but for whom the reliability of the procedure cannot be
tested. Frequently, patients request release and later withdraw their requests. The decision to withdraw a request may reflect only that the patient
has vacillated in his desire for institutionalized treatment. There is evidence, however, that patients sometimes withdraw requests in response
to threats of involuntary commitment from hospital personnel. 14 The
initial decision to detain such patients, withdrawn when the request for
142.
143.
144.
145.

See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-1-14(C) (1978).
424 U.S. at 346, n. 29.
Id.
Unpublished study by Gilboy & Schmidt, American Bar Foundation (1973).
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release is withdrawn, will not be tested for error or factored into the
measure of the reliability of the procedure.
The identity of the decision-maker is another factor affecting the fairness and sufficiency of the procedure. The courts vary widely on the issue
of whether medical decision-making is appropriate in the context of institutionalization of the mentally ill.' 46 Some courts,' 47 and a few mental
health professionals, point to the highly speculative nature of psychiatric
diagnosis. 4'
The appropriateness of the decision-maker will depend, to some extent,
on the criteria for determination. The medical expert may be the better
judge of psychiatric indicators.' 49 The court is well practiced, however,
in hearing and applying medical testimony from experts in a particular
field. Judicial decision-making is also more appropriate where legal standards are being applied.'° Furthermore, the judicial process is better
equipped to protect the liberty interest at stake, applying established due
process requirements. It would be appropriate to authorize a judgment
on the part of hospital authorities only as to whether a patient meets the
criteria for commitment, subject to immediate judicial review.
Due process has never been thought to require that the neutral and detached
trier of fact be law trained or a judicial or administrative officer. [Footnotes
omitted.] Surely, this is the case as to medical decisions, for "neither judges
nor administrative hearing officers are better qualified than psychiatrists to
render psychiatric judgments." In re Roger S.,19 Cal.3d 921, 942, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 298, 311, 569 P.2d 1286, 1299 (1977) (Clark, J., dissenting).
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979). But see. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975),
on the question of whether treatment provided to a patient justified confinement:
[Petitioner, hospital superintendent,] argues that, . . .the Court must assume
that [the patient] was receiving treatment sufficient to justify his confinement,
because the adequacy of treatment is a "nonjusticiable" question that must be
left to the discretion of the psychiatric profession. That argument is unpersuasive. Where "treatment" is the sole asserted ground for depriving a person of
liberty, it is plainly unacceptable to suggest that the courts are powerless to
determine whether the asserted ground is present. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715.
Id. at 574, n. 10.
"turns on the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted
The question.
147.
by expert psychiatrists and psychologists." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S., at
429, .. The medical nature of the inquiry, however, does not justify dispensing
with due process requirements. It is precisely "the subtleties and nuances of
psychiatric diagnoses" that justify the requirement of adversary hearings. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S., at 430,
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, at 496 (1980).
148. See, e.g., F. Hickman & R. Abrams, Preparationand Trial of a Civil Commitment Case,
(A.B.A. Commission on the Mentally Disabled, 1979), reprinted in 5 Mental Disability L. Rep.
358 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hickman & Abrams].
149. But see supra note 147 and accompanying text.
150. Hickman & Abrams, supra note 148, 5 Mental Disability L. Rep. at 369; American Bar
Foundation, supra note 3, at 56.
146.
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3. Governmental Interest in Avoiding Additional Procedure
The final factor for consideration under the Eldridge test is the governmental interest, including administrative and economic costs, in avoiding additional or substituted procedure.' 5' Hospital authorities have an
interest in avoiding additional administrative burdens. Many residential
mental health facilities are already operating with inadequate financial
and manpower resources.' 5 2 Additional procedure, designed to safeguard
the patient's right not to be restrained unnecessarily, requires specific
criteria and standards against which the decision to detain a patient can
be measured. In order to justify detaining a patient under such standards,
hospital personnel will necessarily become more involved with gathering
and considering evidence of the need for continued hospitalization. These
additional requirements will divert limited resources away from mental
health treatment activities.' 53 Also, where legislative safeguards for the
voluntary patient prove more burdensome to the hospital than do the
requirements of civil commitment, hospitals may refuse to accept voluntary admissions, consequently defeating the legislative goal of making
voluntary hospitalization available.
The decision to detain a voluntary patient, absent legal guidelines,
protective procedures, and standards, will not, however, best serve the
interests of the state. Traditionally, the state has an interest in protecting
its citizens from the harmful acts of prematurely released dangerous patients. '4The state also has a traditionally recognized obligation to detain
citizens who pose a danger to themselves. 55 The validity of both of these
interests is unclear in light of evidence that "dangerousness" is not predictable with the use of present psychiatric tools.' 56 They remain, nonetheless, recognized state interests. 57
1 Evidence of the advantages of voluntary
hospitalization 158 indicates an additional and equally important state interest in encouraging voluntary submission to mental health treatment.
In order to better serve state interests, legislative regulation should assure
that the decision is indeed based on reliable medical indicators, fairly
evaluated by an appropriate decision-maker.
151. 4-24
-U.S. at 347-48.
152. Hospitalizationand Discharge, supra note 86, at 69-70.
153. "One factor that must be considered is the utilization of the time of psychiatrists, psychologists, and other behavioral specialists in preparing for and participating in hearings rather than
performing the task for which their special training has fitted them." Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,
605-606 (1979).
154. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
!55. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 71 and 73.
157. See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 6-16 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Courts have held that the state may retain the mentally disabled person
in order to prevent harm to the individual or to others. The individual's
interest in avoiding unnecessary detention is so great that the state may
not deprive the individual of his liberty and privacy without providing
appropriate procedures which will assure a correct determination that he
should be detained. The legislature must provide procedures which assure
a just determination without delay, based on valid indicia that the patient
meets specified criteria under clear standards.
Ideally, under principles of due process, such a determination should
be made before the voluntary patient is detained against his will for any
period of time. A determination made immediately subsequent to the
patient's request for release may, however, deny the patient a meaningful
opportunity to defend against a decision to detain him. The decision to
detain a patient, based upon a preliminary hearing which purports to meet
the requirements of due process, may give rise to a presumption that the
patient meets the criteria for civil commitment. Even where a preliminary
hearing determines only that there is probable cause to believe that the
patient meets the criteria for civil commitment, such a determination may
unfairly disadvantage the patient in the civil commitment proceeding.
The problem remains, however, that the decision by hospital authorities
to detain a patient deprives him of important liberty and privacy interests.
Detention of voluntary patients may also have a detrimental effect on the
advantages of voluntary treatment and the state's interest in encouraging
voluntary admissions. Unless the decision to detain a voluntary patient
after he has requested release is based upon a valid medical assessment
of the patient's mental condition and measured against criteria which
justify involuntary hospitalization, there is a risk that many patients will
be deprived of important interests unnecessarily. If the state determines
that hospital authorities should have the power to detain patients who
present a danger to themselves or others, due process requires some
safeguards against erroneous deprivation.
No patient should be confined longer than necessary to provide a meaningful opportunity to defend the patient's decision to leave the hospital.
Civil commitment proceedings, which provide the procedural protections
afforded other persons facing involuntary hospitalization, should be held
without delay. If the hospital administrators are authorized to detain only
those patients against whom they intend to petition for commitment, there
is some assurance that the decision to detain will be based upon a reasonable belief that the patient meets the criteria for involuntary hospitalization. In order to assure that the patient is able to develop an adequate
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defense while confined pending proceedings, the patient should be afforded full opportunity to consult with counsel and seek independent
medical advice.
It is unfortunate that any individual should be deprived of his liberty
and privacy by being held in a mental hospital against his will. Such
deprivation is unjustifiable when the patient's confinement serves no legitimate state purpose.
CATHERINE GORDON

